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THE SUPREME COURT AND THE POLICE: 1968?
(Comments upon Reflections of a State Reviewing Court Judge Upon the Supreme Court's
Mandates in Criminal Cases by Judge Charles S. Desmond.)
JAMES R. THOMPSON*
In this Symposium, devoted to an examination
of the present relationship between the Supreme
Court of the United States and the police, the pre-
vious authors have examined in detail the existing
state of the law, although voicing, to some extent,
their fears, or hopes, as the case may be, for the
course the Court is taking. This paper is an ex-
ploration, in rather summary form, of the future
of three areas of the law which will not only soon
present the police with new challenges to their
concepts of how the law should be enforced, but
will greatly concern all citizens, including prose-
cutors, defense counsel, and judges.
The title of this Symposium-Tke Supreme
Court and the Police: 1966-was not intended to
further the notion that these two bodies are at war,
or that they should, or do, stand at polar extremes
in their views concerning the proper administration
of American criminal justice. At least implicitly,
however, the title reflects a recognition that such
polarization is currently accepted as a fact by
many of the commentators-lawyers and laymen
alike. I join my fellow authors in deploring those
debates based upon heat rather than light.' What
* Assistant Professor of Law, Northwestern Uni-
versity School of Law; former Assistant State's Attor-
ney, Cook County, Illinois.
The paper that is the subject of Professor Thomp-
son's comments appeared in the September, 1966 issue
of this Journal, at p. 301.
[Since the predictions stated in Professor Thompson's
article are appearing in print only after the Miranda
decision of June, 1966, I feel impelled to assure the
reader that all of the statements in this article concern-
ing Miranda were in fact made, prior to the decision
in that case, at the April, 1966 Conference on the
Supreme Court and the Police at Northwestern Uni-
versity. Moreover, Professor Thompson, in his Brief
and Argument on behalf of the State of Illinois in
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, pointed with fore-
boding to the direction in which the Court logically
would have to go if it reversed Escobedo's conviction.-
Fred E. Inbau].
' See Desmond, Reflections Of A State Re-dewing
Court Judge Upon The Supreme Court's Mandates In
Criinal Cases, 57 J. Crns. L., C. & P. S. 301(1966);
Souris, Stop And Frisk Or Arrest And Search-The Use
And Misuse Of Euphemisms, 57 J. Crxn. L., C. &
P. S. 251, 253, 262 (1966).
will be set forth hereafter is simply a set of pre-
dictions (or more nearly accurate, speculative ap-
praisals) of what may be confronting the police
two years or so from now.
The focus, then, is on The Supreme Court and
the Police: 1968, with as much "neutrality" as can
be mustered by one with a background in the
prosecution of criminal cases, tempered (or perhaps
fortified) by a genuine respect for civil liberties,
admiration of the police, and a lawyer's warm
respect for the highest court in our land.
We begin with Escobedo v. Illinois.2 That case
has been cited, discussed, criticized, praised and
dissected many times in this Symposium. And
except for the fact that I was the lawyer who lost
it, I claim no special qualification for any more per-
ceptive analysis of the decision. Indeed, it is my
view that a prognosis of how the Court will decide
the pending post-Escobedo cases is fairly easy to
make. Recognition of two central factors should
lead to but one conclusion of what the Court is
going to do in deciding whether present police
interrogation techniques are compatible with the
privilege against self-incrimination and the right
to counsel.
One thing that is clear about the Escobedo
opinion, if anything is dear, is that it is now un-
questioned that persons undergoing police interro-
gation are protected by the privilege against self-
incrimination. There is no doubt about that.3
Secondly, under the facts of the Escobedo case,
the Supreme Court of the United States did indeed
recognize a constitutional right to counsel at the
2 378 U.S. 478(1964).
"Without informing him of his absolute right to
remain silent, the police urged him to make a state-
ment." (378 U.S. at 485.) "Our Constitution, unlike
some others, strikes the balance in favor of his privilege
against self-incrimination". (378 U.S. at 488.) "The
accused may, of course, intelligently and knowingly
waive his privilege against self-incrimination... at a
pre-trial stage.. .". (378 U.S. at 490, n. 14.) ". . . the
police have not effectively warned him of his absolute
constitutional right to remain silent.. .". 378 U.S. at
491.
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interrogation stage. When the Court reversed
Escobedo's conviction it did so on the basis that
his sixth amendment right to counsel had been
violated. 4 So the case turns upon those two factors.
After one has carefully read the Escobedo
opinion and then the opinions of those courts
which have refused to give any more expansive
meaning to the Escobedo holding than its precise
facts would warrant,5 the conclusion is irresistible
that those cases are in serious error.
Once it is recognized that a sixth amendment
right to counsel and a fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination exist during police inter-
rogation, it is difficult to understand how anybody
can be interrogated without proof in the record
that he knows of, and is willing to waive, his right
to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination.
We know, from those cases which have applied
the sixth amendment to defendants who show up in
trial courts without lawyers, that there can be no
waiver of counsel without an explanation of, and a
consideration of the advantages of, the right to
counsel by the defendant. That means somebody
has to give him a warning. In a trial situation the
trial judge gives the warnings.
In my opinion, the Supreme Court of the United
States will hold, in the presently pending cases,7 at
a minimum, that the California Supreme Court
construction of Escobedo8 is correct, i.e., that inter-
rogation cannot proceed unless the record shows
that a defendant has been warned by the police of
his privilege against self-incrimination and his
right to counsel.
The difficulty with the opinions of those courts
which have refused to extend the Escobedo case is
simply this: Either they are refusing to recognize
that the privilege against self-incrimination and the
right to counsel apply during police interrogation-
a view that seems especially untenable in light of
Mr. Justice White's dissent in Escobedo,9 or even in
light of the seemingly restricted holding of the
4 "We hold only that when the process shifts from
investigatory to accusatory ... the accused must be
permitted to consult with his lawyer." 378 U.S. at 492.
5 See, e.g., People v. Hartgraves, 31 Ill.2d 375, 202
N.E.2d 33 (1964). Other cases are collected in Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 519, n. 17 (1966) (dissenting
opinion of Harlan, J.).
6 Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962); Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
7 Miranda v. Arizona; Vignera v. New York; Westover
v. United States; California v. Stewart, 382 U.S. 924,
925, 937.
"People v. Dorado, 62 Cal.2d 338, 398 P.2d 361
(1964).
9 378 U.S. 478, 495 (1964).
majority-or they are positing their opinions on the
doctrine of waiver and are saying, in effect, that
when a man responds to questions he waives the
privilege, and when he does not request counsel, he
waives counsel. 10 But this viewpoint simply cannot
be squared with prior decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States on the question of
waiver of constitutional rights."
Suppose, moreover, that the police do give the
warnings implicitly required by Escobedo, but are
confronted by a defendant under interrogation who
does not have the funds to hire counsel. The police
warn him of his right to counsel, and he says in
response to that warning, "I don't have any money
for a lawyer, but I would like to talk with a lawyer
before I talk further with you gentlemen." The
police say, "Well, we have no lawyer available, nor
do we have the money to obtain counsel for you",
and they proceed with the interrogation.
It seems to me that if the equal protection clause
of the Constitution means anything at all, an in-
digent, who upon hearing of his right to counsel
from the police officer decides to exercise that
right, is then placed in the very position in which
Escobedo was placed in his case-that is, a man de-
manding his right to counsel and yet deprived of
one. And if police interrogation proceeds in defiance
of that demand, as was the situation in Escobedo,
then any other court must come to the same con-
clusion-a confession obtained thereafter is inad-
missible.
One great difficulty with these warnings, how-
ever, is this: who, properly, should give them?
Justice Schaefer, of the Supreme Court of Illinois,
in his recent Rosenthal Lectures at Northwestern
University School of Law, has suggested that
perhaps the warnings ought to be given by magis-
trates rather than by the police. Although I do not
believe that this would be consistent with our
present concept of the magisterial function, I do
agree that it is inconsistent with the police func-
tion to place upon them the responsibility of warn-
ing a potential defendant of his constitutional
rights.
. One of the reasons accounting for the Escobedo
opinion, and perhaps the greatest reason, is that
the Supreme Court of the United States was simply
sick and tired of hearing voluntary confession
10 Cf. People v. Richardson, 32 Ill.2d 472, 477-78,
207 N.E.2d 478, 481 (1965) (dissenting opinion of
Schaefer, J.).
1 See cases cited in note 6, supra and Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391(1963).
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cases; it had labored long enough in the jungle of
conflicting claims by police and defendants-de-
fendants saying "they beat me", and the police
saying they did not. And it was the Court's inevi-
table purpose, in deciding Escobedo as it did, to
intrude a third person into the interrogation proc-
ess-defense counsel.
If the police are to be saddled with the job of
explaining the Constitution to criminal suspects,
not only will they be given a burden inconsistent
with their law enforcement function, but we will
not have emerged very far from this jungle of con-
flicting claims by police and defense. We will prob-
ably end up with the same kind of problems we
now have in those cases where the issue is police
brutality, except the new issues will be whether a
warning was given at all, whether it was given at
an appropriate time, and whether it was fair.
It seems to me, therefore, that the function of
warning the potential defendant of the conse-
quences that he risks if he talks under police inter-
rogation must ultimately be assigned to either the
judiciary or to counsel, and I believe that the
Supreme Court of the United States will soon turn,
not to the judiciary, but to counsel, and will re-
quire a lawyer in the police station for consultation
before any interrogation may proceed.
If this prediction proves to be correct, that re-
sult may or may not have very grave dangers for
law enforcement and the protection of society.
There have been conflicting claims in the litera-
ture and the press recently about just how im-
portant confessions are in solving crime.12 judge
Sobel of New York City made a study and re-
ported that confessions are involved in only ten per
cent of criminal cases.13 However, I have reserva-
tions-and I think almost every law enforcement
official does, and I am sure some defense lawyers
do, too-about the validity of such a conclusion.
Confessions are much more important than that,
especially in cases of homicide, rape, armed robbery
and the like. Moreover, any assessment of the need
for police interrogation must also include a con-
sideration of what are commonly called "exculpa-
tory statements", e.g., alibis or denials of certain
12 "Access to Lawyers Is Urged By Koota," New
York Times, Nov. 27, 1965, §2, p.1; "Confessions Held
Crucial By Hogan," New York Times, Dec. 2, 1965,
§1, p. 1; "Study of Confessions Asked by Weintraub,"
New York Times, Dec. 11, 1965, §1, p. 1.
13 N.Y. Law Journal, Nov. 22, 1965, p. 1. [For an
analysis of Judge Sobel's statistics, see Inbau, Demo-
cratic Restraints Upon The Police, 57 J. C nn. L.,
C. & P. S. 209 (1966)].
elements of the offense, which, if proved false, may
be just as damaging to a defendant as are full ad-
missions of guilt. And it is certainly true that in
some cases the existence of incriminating state-
ments in the prosecutor's file may induce a plea of
guilty, thus obviating any need for their introduc-
tion into evidence at a trial.
If it is true, as critics of the Escobedo rule allege,
that putting a lawyer into the police interrogation
process before it has begun, and keeping him there,
will ultimately mean the abolition of confessions
as a tool of law enforcement, and if that abolition
results in a situation in which many grave and
heinous crimes go unprosecuted because of the lack
of a valid confession as evidence, then perhaps we
should reexamine the one barrier that stands be-
tween the police and the suspect in obtaining those
confessions. That is the privilege against self-in-
crimination. It is not the right to counsel, after all,
that keeps a confession from being admitted into
evidence when it is voluntarily obtained; it is the
refusal to allow counsel to explain the privilege
against self-incrimination. 14
I am not, at this point, prepared to say that we
ought to abandon the privilege against self-in-
crimination. I would have to be convinced, more
than I am at the moment, that the potential danger
to society from the total abolition of confessions
would be as great as some say, and that meaningful
alternatives to the privilege could be devised,
before I took that step, but it ought to be recog-
nized that this is the issue.
The second area of concern about the Supreme
Court's future course is that of the law of search
and seizure. By and large, law enforcement officers
fail to appreciate that the Supreme Court of the
United States has gone quite far to favor the police
in this area; that it has handed down decisions
which, if followed by state appellate and trial
courts (and by the police!) would enable the police
to make, strictly within the confines of the fourth
amendment, almost all, if not all, of the searches
and seizures that efficient law enforcement de-
mands. There rarely is excuse these days for police
officers to illegally seize evidence, particularly if
they have, as my state is fortunate to have, a
modern search and seizure statute.15
The potential reach of Escobedo, however, will
ultimately alter at least one police search and
14 Now so held in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
469-70(1966).
"5 See Ch. 38, Art. 108 ILL. REv. STAT. (1965).
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seizure practice now regarded as routine, and may
drastically affect, as well, the ability of the police
to enforce the laws against gambling, narcotics,
prostitution and other vice crimes.
The routine practice is that of the "consent
search", i.e., a search without warrant, and not
incident to arrest, which is justified by the police
on the ground that the suspect "consented" to it.
The case of Escobedo's co-defendant, a man by
the name of Benedict DiGerlando, furnishes a good
example of this device in operation.
Benedict DiGerlando did not request counsel in
the police station as did Danny Escobedo, and he
also confessed, but in addition to confessing, he re-
vealed the whereabouts of the murder weapon he
had used. The police found it in his home in a
search which was characterized by the trial court,
and by the Supreme Court of Illinois, as a consent
search.
16
It is fair to say that there are serious problems
concerned with the concept of a "consent search",
not only in the case of DiGerlando, but in almost
every consent search case except where it is very
clear that the defendant has indeed volunteered
evidence against himself.17
I believe that the fourth amendment is fully as
important to a defendant in a criminal case as the
fifth amendment, or perhaps even more important,
and if it follows from Escobedo that a defendant's
fifth amendment right not to incriminate himself
cannot be overriden without warning, a defendant's
fourth amendment right to be free from unreason-
able search and seizure cannot be overriden with-
out warning. Since both interrogation and consent
search are premised upon the waiver of constitu-
tional rights, it will not be surprising if the Supreme
Court holds hereafter that there can be no valid
consent to search, especially by one under arrest
or in police custody, until there has been a warning
of the fourth amendment prohibition against un-
reasonable search and seizure, and the conse-
quences of its waiver.iia
Escobedo can be extended further. What about
the now common police practice of infiltrating
police officers into criminal conspiracies; posing
16 People v. DiGerlando, 30 Ill.2d 544, 198 N.E.2d
503(1964).
"7 Most consent search cases are treated as little more
than "swearing contests", e.g., People v. Peterson,
17 Ill.2d 513, 162 N.E.2d 380(1959). See Thompson,
Illinois Search And Seizure Law-The New Frontier,
11 DEPAuI. L. REv. 27, 37-39(1961).
17a Since this paper was prepared a court has so
held. See United States v. Blalock, 255 F. Supp. 268
(D.C. Pa. 1966).
them as members of a gang; having them obtain
not only physical, but verbal, evidence as they sit
at the table with the ringleaders of a conspiracy?
Is that the equivalent of police interrogation? If it
is, then does not Escobedo apply?
The effect of Escobedo upon a related police
practice--that of having a policeman pose as a
customer for narcotics, gambling and prostitution
-is dramatically illustrated by a recent case that
has been largely overlooked, one that arose in the
First Circuit Court of Appeals just late last year,
entitled Lewis vs. United States.' It involved a
criminal conviction for the sale of marijuana, and
in a one paragraph per curiam opinion affirming the
conviction the court said:
Defendant, convicted of selling marijuana
to a government agent who had misrepresented
his identity, claims an unlawful search and
seizure because, thus misled by the agent, he
invited him to his home and there made the
sale. The happy days for law violators that
this claim would produce are not to be. * * *
His reliance upon Escobedo vs. State of Illinois
... is quite misplaced. 19
Certainly an argument can be made for the
proposition that when a police officer engages a
suspect in criminal activity, and records his words
for future use as incriminating evidence, the
criminal has become a "focal suspect" within the
meaning of Escobedo-indeed, more than a mere
suspect-and, if custody is not that important a
consideration, why should not the criminal be
warned, during the offense, of his privilege against
self-incrimination?
Even assuming, however, that there is-because
the crime is not then complete and the defendant
has not yet been subjected to the adversary system
-an answer to the questioned posed above, the
Lewis case argument is potentially a great threat to
current search and seizure practices in the area of
vice control even under orthodox doctrines. For
instance, suppose that a police officer on the nar-
cotics squad receives an anonymous tip that John
Jones is selling narcotics. Upon this information
alone, no search warrant could issue and there
would not be probable cause for the arrest of Jones.
In order to verify the accuracy of the tip, the
officer dresses in old clothes, and, playing the part
of an addict, goes to Jones' home where, under the
impression that the officer is what he claims to be,
Jones admits him to the premises and sell narcotics
18 352 F.2d 799(lst Cir. 1965).
19 Ibid.
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to him. Jones is subsequently arrested, and, prior
to trial, files a motion to suppress any evidence of
the sale on the ground that the officer gained his
knowledge of the crime through an illegal search
and seizure.
Essentially, this was the argument rejected,
along with the Escobedo claim, in Lewis. But does
it not make sense? If the officer, without warrant,
had entered Jones' home to search and find nar-
cotics, the search would have been unlawful and
Jones could not have been convicted for the pos-
session of the narcotics that were found. If the
officer had entered the home, placed Jones under
arrest, with or without warrant, and then searched
incident to the arrest and found narcotics, the same
result would obtain, because the arrest, based en-
tirely upon the anonymous tip of an informer,
would not have been made upon probable cause.
And any supposed "consent" given by the nar-
cotics peddler, Jones, to the entry of the police-
man "addict" is vitiated, is it not, by the "fraud"
perpetrated by the officer in misrepresenting his
identity? But for the improper entry into protected
premises the officer would not have witnessed the
narcotics sale and because the evidence of that
sale is the product of an unconstitutional police
action it must, under the exclusionary rule, be sup-
pressed.
Perhaps this argument has only a seeming, or
surface, plausibility. Perhaps I am seeing ghosts
where there are none. But if this argument, or one
like it, is ever sustained by the Supreme Court,
then the present police methods of investigating the
violation of vice laws will be unalterably changed,
and, in my opinion, for the worse. Since the Su-
preme Court has granted certiorari in LewiS, 20 and
will decide that case next term, "happy days" for
at least some law violators of the worst kind may
soon be here again.
The third, and final, area of the law undergoing
change which warrants some examination returns
us to the subject of police interrogation. Those
who champion the right of the police to engage in
a period of post-arrest, pre-arraignment interroga-
tion by concentrating their efforts only against the
inevitable expansion of Escobedo may soon find
that the horse has disappeared through the back
door while they were attempting to lock the front.
For if Mallory v. United States2l becomes a rule of
due process, thus binding upon the states, and if
20 Lewis v. United States, 382 U.S. 1024(1966).
21354 U.S. 449(1957).
the Wotg Sunm 2 rule, which is now applicable to
the states, is applied with full vigor, little oppor-
tunity for any interrogation following arrest-with
or without warnings-may be left.
Simply stated, Mallory holds that federal police
may not unnecessarily delay taking a defendant
before a magistrate following arrest and that such a
violation of Rule 5(a)2' vitiates any confession ob-
tained during the period of "unnecessary" delay.
As Professor Pye has pointed out,2' the lower fed-
eral courts have been quite liberal in construing
the phrase "unnecessary delay", and the conse-
quent rule of practice allows interrogation during
the time necessary for "booking" and other police
procedures of the paperwork variety and, more
importantly, during that period of time when a
magistrate is "not available" to arraign the de-
fendant, e.g., while the courts are closed at night
and on weekends. Since, in practice, some oppor-
tunities for interrogation seem to be afforded even
under the Mallory rule, law enforcement people
would probably not react to the extension of the
rule-as it exists in practice -to the states with
the initial horror produced by the promulgation
of Escobedo.
A close reading of the Mallory opinion itself,
however, does not warrant such potential equa-
nimity. The disparity between Justice Frank-
furter's language in Mallory, and the development
of the rule in practice, is so great as to lead one to
wonder whether the lower federal courts which
have "interpreted" Mallory have in mind the same
opinion. The central teaching of Mallory is that the
police are to be discouraged from arresting persons
on suspicion and then supporting the arrest, and
subsequent charge, with a confession obtained dur-
ing post-arrest interrogation conducted before pre-
senting the defendant to a magistrate. That pur-
pose is explicitly frustrated when the police utilize
even a period of necessary delay for interrogation.
The Court has not decided a Mallory case since
that opinion was handed down, and because the
lower federal courts have effectively thwarted the
original rationale of that case, it is my belief that,
in the near future, the Court will find the oppor-
tunity to hold what they said in Mallory-that
the period between arrest and arraignment is not
meant to be used for the purpose of interrogation,
however "necessary" the delay for other reasons.
12 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471(1963).2
1 FED. R. CRIe. P. 5(9).
24 Pye, The Supreme Court And Tie Police: Fact and
Fiction,- J. Cijm. L., C. & P. S.- (1966).
19661
JAMES R. THOMPSON
Moreover, there is some evidence that at least a
partial Mallory rationale is dose to adoption in the
state courts as a matter of state due process.
Though the state supreme courts have long re-
sisted pleas that they adopt a state Mallory rule,
25
at least one court, the Supreme Court of Wis-
consin, has recently gone part way down the road
to such a result. In State v. Phillipsu Mr. Justice
Hallows said quite plainly that when a man is ar-
arrested upon a warrant a judicial proceeding has
been initiated against him and it is assumed that,
at that point, the police have enough evidence to
hold him for examination by a magistrate. The
only purpose of detention thereafter, the court con-
cluded, is to allow the police to present him to the
magistrate, and interrogation during this period
violates due process.
Though the state courts have sought, by and
large, to avoid the holding of Wong Sun, their
semi-defiance cannot long continue. Wong Sun
was the case in which a Chinese seller of narcotics
confessed after the police had unlawfully invaded
his home. The Supreme Court found that since the
entry and subsequent arrest violated the Constitu-
tion, his oral admission, which was the product of
that entry and arrest, could not be used in evidence
against him because intangible, as well as tangible,
fruits of unconstitutional action are subject to the
exclusionary rule. Wong Sun has been interpreted
by the state courts in subsequent cases to apply
only to admissions which follow unconstitutional
entries into protected premises or "coercive" ar-
rests.n In my opinion, however, the case plainly
stands for the proposition that incriminating state-
ments which are the product of detention following
an arrest without probable cause are inadmissible.
Without regard to Escobedo or Mallory, the Su-
preme Court undoubtedly will so hold in the near
future. The police would do well, therefore, to re-
examine their present tendency to make a large
percentage of arrests on suspicion not amounting
to probable cause, for here at least, is one rule
which may be avoided by the reformation of
current practices.
In conclusion, I should like to direct a few words,
25 Thompson, From Arrest to Arraignment In Illinois:
Some Exclusionary Principles,-U. ILL. L. F.-
(1966).
26 - Wis.-, 139 N.W.2d 41 (1965). See also,
Thompson, Abstracts of Recent Cases, 57 J. CRi_. L.,
C. & P. S. 178, 183-185 (1966).
27 KmsASsa, EQUAL JUSTICE IN TnE GATEIIouSES
AND MANSIONS OF AMRIcAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
in CPUNAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 41 (1965).
in the nature of friendly advice, to the police, with
whom I have worked since the day I became a
lawyer. My respect and admiration, and at times,
my sympathy, for them is unbounded. Those of
us who have been closely identified with the proc-
essess of criminal justice are probably more keenly
aware of police faults-the occasional brutality;
the sometimes officiousness; the disturbing "white"
perjury employed to evade exclusionary rules in
those cases in which the police think the defendant
is guilty. But there is another side of the coin:
The policeman's lot is not a happy one. The
comfortable citizen who growls at the park-
ing ticket on his windshield ignores the brutal,
dirty, and cynical side of police work; the ne-
cessity to deal with pimps, whores, drunks,
bums, hoodlums, street gangs, rioters, mur-
derers, and petty thieves day after day on bad
hours, low pay, and, unfortunately too often,
undeserved public contempt.2M
And, sadly, I note an increasing alienation of the
police from the rest of American society. Colin
Maclnnes, in Mr. Love and Justice, has put it well:
... The story is all coppers are just civil-
ians like anyone else, living among them not
in barracks like on the Continent, but you and
I know that's just a legend for mugs. "We are
cut off: we're not like everyone else. Some civil-
ians fear us and play up to us, some dislike us
and keep out of our way but no one-well,
very few indeed-accepts us as just ordinary
like them. In one sense, dear, we're just like
hostile troops occupying an enemy country.
And say what you like, at times that makes
us lonely.2M
In his paper presented at this Symposium, my
colleague, Professor Inbau, closed with a plea first
voiced by Commissioner G. B. McClellan of the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police:
When the policeman exceeds his authority,
bring him up short, but when he is doing, as
most of them are doing, a tough, thankless and
frequently dangerous job for you and for all
you hold dear, for God's sake get off his back."
I echo these sentiments, but I add a further note.
There exists, among police, a dogged and seemingly
unshakeable notion that Supreme Court decisions
restricting police practices in the enforcement of
28 Thompson, Book Review, Chicago Tribune Booxs
TODAY, Aug. 21, 1966, p. 7.
29 Ibid.
30 Inbau, Democratic Restraints Upon The Police, 57
3. CR. L., C. & P. S. 265, 270 (1966).
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the criminal law are not only aimed "personally" at
them, but, supposedly undermining their effective-
ness, make them "responsible" to the citizenry for
rising crime rates and the inability to capture,
charge and convict all persons who have committed
crimes.
It is high time that the police of America rid
themselves of this patellar-like reaction to deci-
sions such as Escobedo, Wong Sun, Mallory, and the
others. The fourth, fifth and sixth amendments
were put into our Constitution long ago. It is the
duty of the Supreme Court to interpret these con-
stitutional provisions and whether particular de-
cisions be thought right or wrong they must be
accepted or else the Constitution should be
changed. The Supreme Court has adopted the
device of the exclusionary rule because it has
found no worthy alternative to enforce compliance
with these fundamental restrictions upon the power
of society to deal with those accused of crime. To
the extent that credible evidence is excluded from
the fact finding process supposedly designed to find
"truth" therefore, we must accept the fact that
some persons whom we know to have committed
offenses will go unpunished.
The point is that this is not the fault of the police
and they ought to quit blaming themselves for
their inability-if no honest alternatives to prac-
tices condemned by exclusionary rules can be
found-to prevent crimes and catch criminals. So
long as the American people are willing to tolerate
a system of constitutional regulation which in some
instances restricts society's power to deal with
criminals on a totally efficient basis, the police can-
not be blamed for gaps in the war against crime.
Too often, the police are on their own "backs";
their frustrations, cynicism and bitterness at not
being able to "do their job" are too often self-im-
posed. If the police act within the rules that all the
people--not just the Supreme Court-have sanc-
tioned; if they are supplied with the money, man-
power and training necessary to raise the profession
-and it is a profession-to the level where it'must
be placed, then all that can be expected of them
will have been done.
